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"The primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain 
international peace and security."
John Foster Duties. September 17, 1953.
"...the United Nations has the power to suppress acts of aggression."
Eduard A. Shevardnadze. September 25. 
1990.
I. INTRODUCTION: A SYSTEM FOR INTERNATIONAL PLACE
Throughout history, humankind has driven towards the universal 
goal of maintaining the peace. The Greeks created the Delian League in 
an effort to keep the peace. The emerging European powers of the 
1800's adopted a "grand coalition" for the purpose of sustaining 
security (Ray 1990, 399). The League of Nations, a product of the First 
World War, sought to limit the occurrence of international conflict. 
Today, the United Nations, a product of the Second World War, 
continues vigorously to pursue this all-important goal.
The present system of maintaining international peace and 
security is in many ways a hybrid of these other past systems, and as 
such it carries with it many of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
previous systems. The preceding League of Nations had several
mechanism that could enforce the decisions handed down by the 
governing body. Without enforcement, "the League of Nations 
experience demonstrated that if states were simply left to their own 
devices to provide forces and support to redress a situation, the 
response would be minimal" (Boulden 1990, 9). This was a crucial 
lesson to be learned, and it formed the framework for the discussions 
that ultimately established the present United Nations.
Using the League of Nations as a guide, staff members at the U.S. 
Department of State began to deliberate, as early as 1942. on the 
possibility of establishing a post-war collective security arrangement 
(Boulden 1990, 9). This initial examination was later to serve as the 
basis for the first official discussions on the United Nations. As the 
Second World War drew to a close, representatives from the five great 
powers convened for the purpose of creating an international 
organization whose objective would be to maintain peace and security 
in the post-war world (Hilderbrand 1990, 140). These discussions, held 
at Dumbarton Oaks, set the stage for the final round of talks in San 
Francisco that ultimately led to the ratification of the United Nations 
Charter in 1945 (Ray 1990, 444).
Although the United Nations Charter is essentially "a revised 
League", it differs from the former international organization, in that it 
seeks to overcome the League's inability to enforce decisions and 
sanctions (Larus 1965, 214). In order to meet this vital requirement of
enforceability, the framers of the Charter devised the * Article 43 
iysteit"--a system which “reflected a i t s  Five agreetneitt to agree on 
how the Security Council would be given an effective military arm" that 
would be capable of enforcing the mandates put forth by the United 
Nations (Fabian 1972, 58). The Charter called for "special agreements" 
to be concluded so that the necessary logistical means for
implementation would be met:
A’ticle 43
1. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to 
the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake 
to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in 
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed 
forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, 
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace 
and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers 
and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general 
location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be 
provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as 
possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be 
concluded between the Security Council and Members or 
between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall 
be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance 
with their respective constitutional processes. (Solm 1968, II)
The provisions spelled out in Article 43 for maintaining a United 
Nations military force have taken on a new level of significance in light 
of the recent developments in the international arena. The end of the 
Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Persian Gulf Crisis 
have all contributed to changing the face of the United Nations 
(Scheffer, Rifht v. Might 2nd ed. 125). And with this change has come 
the heightened possibility of ratifying "special agreements" in the near 
future; such action would have a positive effect in advancing the notion 
of collective security. In order to fully examine the ramifications that a 
"working" Article 43 system would have on collective security, it will 
be necessary to consider the events that have led to our present 
arrangement as well as the effects of more recent experiences on the 
present system and future schemes. However, preceding this analysis, 
it will be necessary to review the notion of collective security as it will 
provide the framework for this discussion of Article 43.
II. COLLECTIVE SECURITY
One of the primary purposes of the United Nations Charter as 
stated in Article I is "to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace" (Sohn 1968, 2). 
Collective security can be operationally defined as multilateral action or 
arrangement to prevent or halt armed acts of aggression (Naidu 1974, 
12-13). This definition of collective security and its establishment as 
the principal course of action to be taken in instances in which the
pcacehas teen breached* however, d id n o t occufovt
ijj— culmination tit veers nt ifclalihi* • • In' "d
security arrangements have their origins in the fourteenth 
fifteenth centuries when European monarchs pledged to support eaeh 
other against aggressive actions carried out by other states (Laras 
1965, l). While the concept has evolved considerably from its feudal 
beginnings, the basic idea of collective security has remained an 
integral part of insernaiinnal relations.
The modem view of collective security has its roots in the Treaty 
of Gmabruck of 1789-a treaty that was designed to resist the spread 
of ideas inspired by the French Revolution (Larus 1965, 5). The most 
important contribution that the Treaty of Osnabruck made to the 
modern interpretation of collective security was the conception 
requiring uil parlies of the treaty to provide defense "against 
whomsoever it may be..." (Larasi965, 5). This principle of collective 
action which is codified in this early treaty represents what is perhaps
the bedrock of a successful collective security arrangement--success 
being defined as the ability to prevent or stop acts of aggression (Haas 
1967-68, 44). As James Ray notes, an "ideal [collective security
arrangement] implies a willingness by all states to oppose any state 
committing aggression..." (1990, 449). Without a requirement to 
oppose any and ail aggressors through collective action, an agreement 
to maintain international peace and security could quickly crumble if
the signatory states chose to opt out of the collective action for reasons
of self-interest. Because of this and 'he ultimate failure of the League
of Nations, the wording of Article 43 stipulates that " | a] 11 members of 
the United Nations" contribute armed forces for use in the collective 
security role. Though this exigency has not yet been met within the
parameters of the present Charter, the principles put forth by the 
Treaty of Osnabruck, nevertheless, stand ready to be implemented 
given any future ratifications of special agreements.
This notion of collective, non-discriminatory action as formally 
promulgated in the Treaty of Osnabruck, however, describes only one 
aspect of a successful collective security system. Another inherent 
feature in such a system is the reliance on and faith in an 
"international" solution to the act of aggression. All nation-states 
participating in a collective security arrangement must be confident 
that the action taken by the collective group is the best response to the 
problem (Ray 1990, 449). In each instance of crisis, a concerted effort 
must be viewed as the optimal method of handling an act of aggression 
and violence. Not only, must all nations view the collective action 
against aggression as beneficial to the international system, but they 
must also view the action as conducive to their own national interests 
(Haas 1967-68, 41). Because of the collective nature of the action, it is 
necessary that a majority consensus be reached by the 
member-nations in order to foster legitimacy and longevity in the 
existing collective security arrangement (Naidu 1974, 20-21).
Collective security, therefore, essentially rests on the efficacy (or 
perceived efficacy) of a common international solution to a problem.
Faith in the system alone, however, can not always guarantee a
triumphal outcome to a crisis. A collective security arrangement also 
requires that all (or virtually all) nation-states be members of the
system. This prerequisite must be met or else the collective security 
system risks becoming only an alliance system or a balance of power 
system (Naidu 1974, 25). An alliance assumes that only a few 
countries are involved in a security arrangement and such a system 
severely limits the scope and depth of action that can be taken in
response to an act of aggression. For instance, NATO, a successful 
alliance security arrangement, is limited in both the scope and depth of 
its operations because of geographic and political constraints. Military 
forces under the auspices of NATO can not conduct operations outside 
of the geographic area that is delineated in the treaty. A collective 
security arrangement can overcome this disadvantage by allowing all 
members of the international community to be a part of the security 
system. An ideal security system, therefore, would in essence be a 
veritable global alliance--with all nations being members of that
alliance.
By providing universal membership, a collective security 
arrangement can also contribute to the diffusion of power, which is
necessary for a successful implementation of the system (Naidu 1974, 
24). No single power can be allowed to dominate the security system. 
A truly ideal and effective collective security arrangement "would 
consist of a number of states of equivalent power so that none is too 
strong to be dominating or too weak to be ineffectual" (Naidu 1974, 
24). However, in our present international community in which power
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is concentrated in the few, it is difficult to realize this situation 
exemplar. Perhaps a more realistic approach to diffusing power would 
be to ensure that the major powers "enjoy a minimum of political
solidarity and moral community" (Stromberg cited in Larus 1974, 292). 
The inclusion of all nations into the collective security system provides 
for the possibility that no one power would be able to withstand a
combined and unified threat from the member-nations. The union of 
smaller powers serves, therefore, as a deterrent to aggressive action on 
the part of any one of the major powers.
An international force, faith in the system, universal membership 
and diffused power are all essential elements of a collective security
arrangement, but they are not sufficient alone to ensure the success of 
that arrangement. Even with the presence of all of these elements, a
collective security system can fail or have its effectiveness drastically 
reduced. These factors merely serve as the framework lor a collective 
security arrangement, for the key component to a successful security 
arrangement is force and the provision for force. President Woodrow 
Wilson addressed this issue in a speech when he remarked that Mjiff 
you say, 'we shall not have any war', you have got to have the force to 
make that 'shall' bite...” (cited in Naidu 1974, 5). Although President 
Wilson was never able to witness the fruition of his vision of collective 
security, his ideas were crucial to the formation of the United Nations. 
These ideas on collective security and those of Wilson, ultimately 
became the basis for the formation of Article 43.
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9III. BEGINNINGS--THE EARLY HISTORY OF ARTICLE 43
The development of Article 43 has been a process of evolution-its 
meaning changing along with the times. Events and the lessons learned 
from these events have helped to shape its formation. There are,
however, three significant events that have contributed to the 
composition of the atucle. These three events-the League of Nations 
experience, the Dumbarton Oaks discussions and the San Francisco 
Conference-have all greatly influenced the codification of the present 
collective security arrangement (Boulden 1990, 9). Indeed, the topic of 
force provision and the means of implementing such a force were 
central to the discussions that took place in each of these historical 
events. In each discussion, in fact, the points now outlined in Article 
43 were considered to be sine qua non conditions for a successful 
collective security arrangement. Thus, in order to more carefully 
understand the implications that are offered by Article 43, it is 
beneficial to examine, in turn, the effects of these three formative 
events on the creation of the article.
The League of Nations
At the conclusion of World War I, the major powers convened for 
the purpose of creating a system that would be based on the principle 
of collective security; the outcome was the formation of the League of 
Nations (Ray 1990, 442). The conventional wisdom of the time placed 
the blame for the outbreak of the war on "antagonistic alliances and the
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faulty mechanism of the balance of power" (Haas in The United Nations 
and the M ain tenance  of International Peace and Security 1987, 5). A 
system based on collective action and international solutions to crises, 
it was thought, would greatly reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. 
However, several flaws quickly became apparent and these served to 
hinder the effectiveness of League policies and operations.
The most notable of these flaws was the inadequacy on the part of 
the League to provide armed forces for the purpose of enforcing its 
sanctions (Hilderbrand 1990, 139-140). Though Article 16 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations called for member-nations to
"severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the 
covenants of the League," these troops were to be provided only on a 
voluntary basis (Seyersted 1966, 26-27). This significant fault meant 
that the actions taken by the League could not always be enforced.
Seeking to surmount this sizable problem, the French proposed that a 
military pool be formed so that in times of crisis the League Council 
could draw on this force for the purpose of implementing its policies 
and enforcing its decisions (Boulden 1990, 9). This proposal, which 
ultimately was incorporated into the Geneva Protocol of 1924, later 
reappeared during the Dumbarton Oaks discussions when it laid the 
foundation for the writing of Article 43.
Dumbarton Oaks
Using the experiences of the League of Nations us a guideline,
representatives from the four major powers--United States, Great
Britain, China and the Soviet Union-met in 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks in 
Washington, D.C., to discuss the practicality and possibility of a 
post-war collective security arrangement (Ross 1966, 22). Though the 
discussions were only preliminary and the proposals only tentative, the 
proceedings at Dumbarton Oaks heavily influenced the final round of 
discussions at San Francisco where the United Nations Charter was 
finally signed and put into effect. “At the technical level, the great 
powers exchanged views, hammered out compromises, and identified 
the differences which would require resolution at a higher political 
level" (Chen 1973, 25). With much of the talks centering on military 
and security issues, the issue of force provision was inevitably 
addressed and the ideas that ultimately became spelled out in Article 
43 were formally written down for the first time (Evatt 1948, 6). 
Indeed, the Dumbarton Oaks conference went a long way in furthering 
the notions expressed in Article 43 and Chapter VII.
This formal consideration of maintaining forces for enforcement 
purposes raised some key questions concerning the actual structure 
and rules that would govern such a force. Among the questions raised 
were the following: How should the force be constituted? Who will lead 
the force? What types of military power should it deploy and use? 
Would the force be able to use the facilities and resources of other 
countries? (Hilderbrand 1990, 140). These questions had to be 
answered before any formal agreement could be presented for signing. 
Each country entered the discussions with their own thoughts on these 
issues, but they all generally agreed that provisions for an international
force be made in any future collective security arrangement i.e., the 
United Nations (Hilderbrand 1990, 140). The representatives all 
believed that the lack of such a force in the League of Nations largely 
attributed to its failure-and they did not want to err again.
One of the first priorities of the conference representatives was to 
examine the different possibilities for creating a military force. 
Essentially, the conference considered three options for determining 
the nature of the forces to be used (Boulden 1990, 10). The first 
option, which was strongly advanced by the U.S. State Department, was 
the use of ad hoc forces for enforcement purposes (Hilderbrand 1990, 
140). This type of force would be determined on an as-nceded basis 
and would be earmarked for special purposes; these forces would not 
be permanent in nature. The second option was the establishment of a 
permanent international force that would be under the aegis of the 
collective security organization (Boulden 1990, 10). Finally, the third 
option consisted of maintaining a military force pool drawn from 
national contingents (Boulden 1990, 10). The difference between the 
second and third option lay primarily in the level of autonomy that the 
forces would have once deployed. In option two, the forces would be 
under the direct command of the collective security organization, and 
OQi the command of their home government. The third option allowed 
the governments of the contributing forces to exert more control over 
the collective security force. The consideration of these options
represented a drastic departure from the previous experiences with 
the League of Nations, and these three options were to take on primary
importance in the writing of Article 43. It is, therefore, beneficial to 
analyze the advantages and dis antages of each option as addressed 
at the Dumbarton Oaks conference.
Ad Hoc Forces
Forces created on an ad hoc basis have several advantages. The 
first, and. perhaps most overwhelming advantage of forming forces in 
this manner is that the force can be tailored to meet the operational 
requirements of each case, because of its formation on as-needed basis, 
in addition, the U.S. State Department advanced the argument that 
forces formed on an ad hoc basis would be easier to control and less 
likely to be become the strong arm of a global "superstate” 
(Hilderbrand 1990, 140). A common concern voiced at the time was 
that of maintaining national sovereignty in the face of an international 
collective security arrangement (Wilcox and Marcy 1955, 165). An ad 
hoc force would avoid this concern by placing much of the control of 
the forces in the hands of the individual, contributing states, thereby 
upholding the sovereignty of each nation. However, a force drawn on 
this basis would carry with it the disadvantage of being less cohesive 
and more vulnerable to logistical problems than a more permanent 
force. This type of force provision, because of its parallels with the 
League of Nations, was ultimately given less weight when the topic was 
discussed in San Francisco (Boulden 1990, 10).
Permanent Forces
This second option for collective security military forces was 
viewed, in many ways as the ideal choice for force provision and 
maintenance. Initially, the planners at the U.S. State Department 
favored this force-type over the ad hoc arrangement (Hilderbrand 
1990, 140). This option called for an international police force to be
formed under the direct control of the collective security organization
(Hilderbrand 1990, 140). As a permanent, standing force, it offered 
many advantages over a less permanent ad hoc force. Unlike the aji 
hoc forces described previously, this force would always be available 
for rapid deployment anywhere in the world (Hilderbrand 1990, 140).
Moreover, a force that was permanent in nature might be more 
"homogenous" and "would fight with more esprit than would national 
contingents brought together at the last minute (Hilderbrand 1990, 
140). Permanent forces, under the auspices of an international 
collective security organization, might also allow the armies of the 
major powers to disarm without feeling threatened as the powers could 
rely on the United Nations for defense (Hilderbrand 1990, 140).
Although the idea of maintaining permanent forces was initially 
attractive to the major powers, it too was eventually discarded as a
plausible option for enforcing collective security decisions. Contrary to 
the loosely organized force structure that characterized the ad hoc force 
concept, this option was considered too structured and too implicit of a 
world government (Boulden 1990, 10).
Before being ultimately rejected, however, the Soviet delegation 
added a corollary to the notion of a permanent force-the creation of a
permanent international air force (Wilcox and Marcy 1955, 165). This 
force was to be designed along the lines of the permanent standing 
force, except that it would not have land and naval components, only 
an air component. The prima facie merits of an international air force 
were considerable. Such a force represented a compromise between 
an ad hoc force and a permanent force. An international air force 
seemed to "meet all of the postwar planner's criteria for effective 
action: it could respond quickly, bring awesome force to bear against a 
guilty nation, and would not require the Great Powers to commit all of 
their military forces to the new world organization" (Hilderbrand 1990, 
142). Even though an international air force differed from the 
permanent force described above, it did carry with it many of the 
disadvantages of the permanent force--at least that was the assertion 
made by the Anglo-American representatives. Chief among these 
disadvantages was the potential loss of sovereignty by the contributing 
nations over their air assets (Hilderbrand 1990, 144). Other negative 
views of the international air force were also espoused. The Americans 
doubted the true effectiveness of a force composed only of airplanes 
and argued that the creation of an international air force might spur an 
arms race as aggressive nations sought to match the airpower of the 
collective security organization (Hilderbrand 1990, 146 and 148). The 
disadvantages finally outweighed the advantages and the international 
air force went the way of the permanent force idea, as it too was 
rejected as a viable option for enforcing the policies of the collective 
security arrangement. With the dismissal of both the ad hoc force and
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the permanent force as alternatives, the members of the Dumbarton 
Oaks conference were left with only the pool force arrangement as an 
option.
Poo! Forces
The proposal for force provision that was finally adopted at 
Dumbarton Oaks was essentially an adaptation of the French proposal 
that was advanced in 1924 for the purpose of modifying the 
enforcement mechanism of the League of Nations. The proposition of a 
pool force arrangement, recommended by Admiral Willson of the U.S. 
delegation, "called for an agreement that would oblige member nations 
to maintain a ready quota of air, sea, and land forces, which would go 
into action against an aggressor immediately upon receipt of an order 
from the council" (Hilderbrand 1990, 149). As this formula for 
providing forces represented a compromise between the two other 
options, Willson's proposal was readily accepted by the other delegates 
and thus laid the groundwork for the eventual creation of Article 43. 
The primary advantage that the pool force offered was flexibility in 
dealing with situations requiring enforcement by the collective security 
organization (Hilderbrand 1990, 149). In addition, this alternative 
allowed the countries to exert more control over their individual force 
allocations, thereby overcoming the difficult issue of sovereignty. 
Though, this option did have some drawbacks, such as not being as 
cohesive as with the permanent force option, the pool force option, 
nevertheless did present itself as the best available choice for
implementing and enforcing the decisions of the collective security 
arrangement. By having a general agreement on this issue, the major 
powers were able to engage in more substantive discussions at the final 
round of discussions in San Francisco.
San Francisco
Building on the previous demarches at Dumbarton Oaks, 
representatives from fifty nations defended on San Francisco in 1945 
in order to finalize the international agreement that ultimately created 
the United Nations (Ross 1966, 23). With much of the preliminary
discussions taken care of at Dumbarton Oaks, the primary emphasis in 
this final round of negotiations was determining the actual wording of 
Article 43. This was no easy task, however, as there existed a
prevailing attitude among the governments of some nations that they 
would lose direct command and control over their forces. Indeed, one 
delegate at the conference noted that the proposal for the Article 43
system "would involve a far more drastic pooling of national 
sovereignties than most members would be willing to contemplate" 
(Wilcox and Marcy 1955, 165). Though, the delegates at the conference 
were able to overcome these reservations and formulate Article 43,
they later resurfaced during the discussions of the Military Staff
Committee. The conference, however, was successful and a great 
number of ideas were generated from the discussions that took place.
While all of the countries contributed to the examination of the 
question of force structure, the United States was able to outline
several key requirements for implementing the provisions of Article 
43. The first criteria (and perhaps most important) called for a large 
force that could effectively deal with any situation that might arise 
(Boulden 1990, 12). The second criteria, also concerned with force 
composition, specified that the external and internal factors of a 
country be taken into account when ascertaining the types of forces to 
be assigned to the United Nations. These factors included population, 
geography, resources and any other limiting factors that affected a 
country's ability to supply troops (Russell 1958, 260). The final criteria 
stated that the "forces should be used without geographical or other 
restriction, as the situation dictatcldJ” (Boulden 1990, 12). The work 
done by the U.S. delegation and other delegations was instrumental in 
gathering the support necessary for the ratification of the article. The 
final approval by the members resulted in, as John Foster Dulles stated, 
"the most striking and far-reaching innovation in the system of 
collective security" (International Conciliation 1946, 191).
IV. THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE
The idealistic, breakthrough system of collective security 
envisioned by Secretary Dulles, however, was never able to be realized 
and in effect became a dead letter. Though, the Charter had been 
ratified at the San Francisco conference, the member nations failed to 
conclude any special agreements that were called for under Article 43. 
In order to establish a set of criteria and principles to guide the process
of concluding future special agreements, the Security Council, in one of 
its first acts, authorized the Military Staff Committee (MSC) to study the 
provisions contained in Article 43 and to issue a report on their 
findings (Bowett 1964, 13). However, after two years of study, the 
Military Staff Committee was unable to reach a consensus and a 
deadlock ensued as to the future of Article 43. Although, much of the 
stalemate was due to political reasons, the ideas and arguments 
presented by the Military Staff Committee, nevertheless offer keen 
insight on the workings and provisions of Article 43. Therefore, an 
examination of the Military Staff Committee and its proceedings during 
the critical years of 1946 and 1947 is essential to understanding 
Article 43.
Formation and Organization
Legal bases for the creation of the Military Staff Committee cun be 
found in Article 47 of the United Nation's Charter:
[tjhere shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise 
and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the 
Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the employment and 
command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of 
armaments, and possible disarmament. (Sohn 1968, 12) 
However, in order to trace the origins of the Military Staff Committee 
one must go back farther than the original wording offered in the 
Charter. The idea of creating a committee to oversee the military
affairs of the United Nations was first seriously considered during the 
discussions at Dumbarton Oaks. The members of the conference all 
agreed that a multilateral group of military officials was necessary in 
order to command the forces provided by special agreements.
Though the representatives at Dumbarton Oaks agreed in principle 
to the adoption of a Military Staff Committee, they did not all agree on 
the composition and function of the committee. The British delegation 
urged that the committee be formed along the lines of "the Combined 
Chief of Staff system that they and the Americans had developed for 
fighting the war in Europe" (Hilderbrand 1990, 156). While the 
Americans shared many of the British views, they had formulated their 
own plan for the committee and they termed it the Security and 
Armaments Commission. The Commission’s purpose was to advise the 
Security Council on military matters. These matters of military concern 
included: assessing the strategic aspects of crisis-situations; overseeing 
the logistic operations and command of the collective security force; 
and supervising the regulation of armaments (Bouldcn 1990, 11). 
After some compromise, the two different plans were combined to 
form the nucleus of what is now referred to as the Military Staff 
Committee.
Because of its integral role in commanding the Article 43 forces, 
the issue of who should comprise the Military Staff Committee was of 
profound importance, and therefore one that needed to be decided 
quickly. Through examination of the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, one 
can see that there were essentially three different options thut were
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considered for establishing the membership of the committee. The 
alternatives included the following: creation of an ad hoc com m and 
that would be situationally defined; a liaison command structure 
between the Military Staff Committee and military representatives 
from the several members; or reliance on a standing military staff 
(Hilderbrand 1990, 157). Ultimately, the delegates chose to make the 
Military Staff Committee a permanent organ of the United Nations with 
its membership "consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent 
Members of the Security Council or their representatives" (Gardner
1991, 11). The composition of the committee is important to consider 
because the attitudes and ideological beliefs of the members was one of 
the main reasons for the Military Staff Committee's inability to come up 
with an agreement on Article 43. The addition of other, non-aligned 
countries to the ranks of the of the committee could have possibly
prevented the im p a sse  that occurred during the committee's 
deliberations. With their organization defined and a task to accomplish, 
the Military Staff Committee went to work on the planning of a United 
Nations force.
The 1946 and 1947 Discussions
The discussions that began on February 4, 1946 and continued 
over the course of the next fourteen months are significant because
they are the only formal negotiations to be held on the subject of
Article 43 (Frye 1957, 53). They are also significant because they 
ended in a failure to conclude the special agreements that would have
given the United Nations the teeth that it needed to enforce its 
decisions. Of the 41 items that the committee identified in its 
discussions as relating to a United Nations military force, only 25 were 
agreed upon by all of the members (C o llec tive  Security  
Possibilities... 1991. 2). On April 30, 1947, the Military Staff Committee 
submitted its report on Article 43 to the Security Council for their 
review. The disagreements over the article quickly became apparent 
to the Security Council and they extended the length of the study in 
order to work out the areas of contention (Bailey 1975, 215). finally 
on July 2, 1948, the chairman of the Military Staff Committee notified 
that an agreement was not going to be reached and any further 
discussions would be deadlocked (Bailey 1975, 215). Thus, the formal 
consideration of Article 43 by the United Nations came to an 
inconclusive end. The report that the Military Staff Committee issued, 
entitled "General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed 
Forces Made Available to the Security Council by the Member Nations 
of the United Nations," serves as a useful reference for analyzing 
Article 43. The report is "perhaps of more than historical significance, 
for fit} indicate!si not only a large area of agreement between the five 
Powers but also the areas where disagreements exist and, therefore, 
where the major difficulties in the way of implementing the Charter 
scheme for the provision of international forces lie” (Bowctt 1964, 14).
An examination of these points is, therefore, conducive to 
comprehending the implications of the Article 43 system. A survey of 
these points follows. For clarification, the article numbers, unless
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otherwise noted, refer to articles in the Military Staff Committee report,
not to articles of the United Nations Charter.
General Principles and Points of Agreement
The final report issued by the Military Staff Committee did not 
highlight only the areas of disagreement, it also indicated that there 
were several points of agreement by the major powers. Though most 
of the areas of agreement essentially dealt with the general principles 
of Article, these general principles had to be agreed to before any 
further work could be done on Article 43. The members of the Military 
Staff Committee, in their report, reiterated the purpose of maintaining 
forces under the aegis of the U.N. by noting that the forces should be 
used to maintain or restore international peace and security as well as 
provide a means of enforcement for United Nation's resolutions (Bowett 
1964, 14 & Article 1 of the Repertory of United Nations Practice 1955, 
396). Agreement on this point enabled the Military Staff Committee to 
focus more of their discussions on the actual composition of the force 
and the ways in which it would be employed.
The second area that was generally agreed to was the structure 
and make-up of the forces, which are outlined in Chapters II and III of 
the report. Chapter II, which discusses the composition of armed 
forces, calls for the United Nations force to consist of "national armed 
forces, land, sea and air...from the best trained and equipped units 
(formations) of Member Nations" (Chapter II of the Repertory of United 
Nations Practice 1955, 396-397). These provisions, in fact, were
accepted without discussion and unanimously agreed to by the Military 
Staff Committee. In terms of overall strength (Chapter III of the MSC 
report), it was agreed that the size of the force would be influenced by 
the "moral weight and potential power" of the United Nations. It was 
also agreed that the forces would have to be of "sufficient strength to 
enable the Security Council to take prompt action in any part of the 
world"; this agreement fostered the idea of maintaining a U.N. rapid 
deployment force (Articles 5 & 6 of the Repertory of United Nations 
Practice 1955, 397). The final part of Chapter III stales that the final 
determination on overall strength will be made by the Security Council 
and will be dependent on the "international conditions" of the time 
(Articles 7 & 8 of the Repertory of United Nations Practice 1955, 
397-398). These terms were agreed to by all of the members except 
the Soviets who accepted them on the condition that the principle of 
equality be used as the basis for force contributions.
General agreement was also reached on the topics covered by 
Articles 13, 14 and 15. These articles covered the areas of force 
contribution by individual member nations. The agreement on Article 
13 ensured that a member nation would not have "to increase the 
strength of its armed forces or to create a particular component thereof 
for the specific purpose of making a contribution to the armed forces 
(of the United Nations)" (Article 13 of the Repertory of United Nations 
Practice 1955, 399). By achieving an accord on this issue, the Military 
Staff Committee hoped to limit any international arms buildup and thus 
preclude an arms race. As an alternative to providing forces, the
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agreement on Article 14 allowed nations to provide facilities or other 
assistance if they were not able to provide such forces (Boulden 1990, 
13). Finally, the members of the Military Staff Committee were able to 
come to a consensus on Article 15 which permitted member nations to 
change the size of their contributions with the conclusion of additional 
special agreements (Article 15 of the Repertory of United N at io n s  
Practice 1955, 399-400). An understanding on the points addressed in 
these articles made the workings of the Article 43 system more flexible 
and adaptable.
After reaching a general agreement on the question of force 
contribution, the Military Staff Committee was also able to achieve 
concurrence on the issues of force employment and readiness. 
Specifically, they assented to employing forces on the decision of the 
Security Council and for the purpose of maintaining international peace 
and security, as called for by Article 42 of the Charter (Articles 18 & 19 
of the Repertory of United Nations Practice 1955, 401). This agreement 
also contributed to the idea of a United Nations rapid deployment force, 
as Article 19 stipulated that forces be used "to forestall or to suppress 
promptly a breach of the peace or an act of aggression" (Ibid.). In 
order to meet these use of force and employment requirements, the 
Military Staff Committee agreed that readiness levels of the U.N. force 
be determined by the Security Council (Articles 22-24 of the Repertory 
of United Nations Practice 1955, 402). The agreements made on these 
articles were valuable as they provided a basis for how the forces 
should be maintained and in what context the forces should be
employed.
In order to ensure the realization of the provisions for force 
employment denoted in Chapter V of the report, the Military Staff 
Committee members made some agreements concerning the logistics of 
the U.N. force. A concord on Articles 29 and 30 meant that "jejach 
Member would be responsible for the logistical support of its own 
forces and and would maintain levels of reserves and replacements 
adequate to maintain these forces" (Bowett 1964, 14). These two 
articles gave the countries more control over their forces, but it also
allowed for logistical problems. By not agreeing on international 
control over the logistical process, the Article 43 force would lace the 
difficult problem of not having standardized ammunition or military
equipment. This could prove to be disastrous on the battlefield if
supplylines broke down. This was also a problem that plagued NATO 
forces for years before it was agreed upon that all forces earmarked for 
NATO operations would be required to use standardized ammunition
and essential military equipment. However, an agreement on this issue 
was important because it allowed the individual, contributing nations 
to maintain sovereignty over their forces, and therefore appease those 
who opposed the idea of forces maintained under the auspices of the 
United Nations.
The final area of agreement centered on the overall command and 
control of the forces. The Military Staff Committee wanted to preserve 
as much sovereignty in the command structure as possible, while at the 
same time keeping it centralized and integrated at the international
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level. In order to achieve this end, they agreed to the provisions 
contained in Articles 36-40. Under Article 36, the forces were to 
remain "under the exclusive command of the respective contributing 
nations, except when, having been made available to the Security 
Council" (Article 36 of the Repertory of United Nations Practice 1955, 
407). Once called upon by the Security Council, they would, however, 
be subject to its authority: strategic direction of the forces would be the 
responsibility of the Military Staff Committee (Articles 36, 37 & 38 of 
the Repertory of United Nations Practice 1955, 407). As a gesture to 
those who were concerned about U.N. infringement on sovereignty, the 
Military Staff Committee approved Articles 39 and 40 which provided
for national contingents to "retain their national character" and be
subject to their own rules as well as being permitted to communicate 
directly with the authorities of their own country (Articles 39 & 40 of 
the Repertory of United Nations Practice 1955, 407). By agreeing to
preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the individual force
contributions as much as was practical, the Military Staff Committee 
was able to keep the idea of a United Nations force alive, thereby 
preventing the entire dissolution of the Article 43 system.
Though over half of the articles of the Military Stuff Committee 
report were ultimately agreed upon by the representatives, there 
remained large areas of disagreement on several important points. 
These points of dissension hindered the smooth implementation of 
Article 43 that was hoped for by the Security Council. In addition, the 
lack of harmony on Article 43 lessened the effectiveness of the United
Nations. With an implementation of Article 43, the United Nations 
could well have been a very different organization. Would the Korean 
War have been fought differently? Would the actions taken in the 
Congo have been different? Would the Persian Gulf Crisis have been 
handled differently? Assuming that a working Article 43 system was in 
place, the answers to all of these questions would most likely be yes; a 
working Article 43 system would have, at the very least, provided the 
United Nations with more options and more flexibility. Therefore, with 
these questions in mind, one can examine the areas of dissension found 
in the Military Staff Committee report--the implications are significant.
Force Size and Contributions
Although, the major powers could agree on the general principle of 
utilizing forces for maintaining international peace and security, they 
could not come to agreement on how big that force should be or who 
should contribute to that force. Indeed as D.W. Bowett notes, "the first 
and insurmountable problem proved to be that of reaching agreement 
on both the total size of the forces and on the relative sizes of the
contributions" (1964, IS). Without agreement on these two points, any 
attempt to implement Article 43 would be fruitless. Essentially, the 
debate on this issue boiled down to a debate between equal 
contributions and comparable contributions (Boulden 1990, 16). The 
Soviets favored, for political reasons, the equal contribution maxim, 
while Great Britain, France, China and the United States advocated the 
comparable contribution criterion. This debate permeated the
discussions of the Military Staff Committee and was the prime reason 
for the deadlock of the committee.
The equal versus comparable contributions debate first manifested 
itself during the discussion of Article 11 of the MSC report. This article 
dealt directly with the issue of force contributions by each individual 
member nation. Two different versions of the text of the article were 
submitted to the Security Council. The Soviet version called for force 
contributions to the Article 43 force to be made on the "principle of 
equality", thereby limiting the influence that any one country could 
exert on United Nations policy (Article 11 of the Repertory of United 
Nations Practice 1955, 399). The text proposed by the other four
members, on the other hand, emphasized the use of "a comparable 
initial over-all contribution" by the member nations ( Article II of the 
Repertory of United Nations Practice 1955, 399). The United States-led 
delegation argued that a force determined by comparable contributions 
would be more effective and balanced than a force based on equal 
contributions (Top Secret Memo from the U.S. Army Chief of Staff on 
the Military Stuff Committee Ridgeway to Army Chief of Staff 
Eisenhower in Foreign Relations of the United States 1947. 403). 
Furthermore, the principle of equality would mean that no country 
could contribute "for example, more planes than China or more 
manpower than France," and this would seriously undermine the 
overall effectiveness of the force (Frye 1957, 54). Raising forces based 
on the comparable contribution criterion, however, might lead to a 
situation, described by Soviet U.Nv representative, Gromyko, as one in
which "some nations would enjoy a predominant position" because of 
their disproportionate control over United Nations military forces. 
Gromyko continued, saying that the situation "might lead to the 
organization of the armed forces being used in the interests of 
individual powerful states and to the detriment of the legitimate 
interests of other countries" (quoted in Boulden 1990, 17). In the 
context of the Cold War, this debate was clearly important, but today 
with the absence of a bipolar world the debate seems somewhat less 
significant. Nevertheless, disagreement on this point ultimately
prevented agreement on other areas such as the composition of an 
international air force and requirements for additional contributions 
(Articles 16 & 28 of the Repertory of United Nations Practice 1955, 
399).
The divergent views on contributions also affected the 
deliberations on the issue of overall force strength. However, the 
question of force size was not as ideologically divided as the question of 
force contributions. Only the United States strongly favored a large 
military force. The other four members advocated that a relatively 
small force would be sufficient to meet the needs of the United Nations 
(Goodrich and Simons cited in Larus 1965, 220). The Soviet Union, 
acting under the assumption that U.N. forces would not be used against 
a permanent member, therefore believed that a small force could 
effectively enforce U.N, decisions (Goodrich and Simons cited in Larus 
1965, 220). The United States took the contrary position and 
recommended that a large military force be formed-one that could be
brought promptly to bear and thus able "to overawe an enemy without 
having to fight" (Secret Memo by the Director of the Office of Special 
Political Affairs in Foreign Relations of the United States 1947. 666). In 
fact, this doctrine heavily influenced the U.S. decision to deploy a large 
international force during the recent Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
operations in the Persian Gulf. Like the disagreements on force 
contributions, the dissent on overall strength of the force is largely the 
result of the Cold War. The United States was so busy trying to contain 
the Soviets (and vice versa), that an acceptable compromise was unable 
to be attained. One need only to look at the memorandums of the time 
to see the suspicion that each side had of the other.
Location of Forces
This suspicion of the other side also affected the discussions on the 
issue of where the forces would be based in peacetime. Disagreement 
on this point arose because some members e.g., the Soviet Union, felt 
that forces should be based in their own territories in order to preserve 
national sovereignty. The opposing view, which was espoused by the
United States delegation stated that the forces could be based "at the 
discretion of Member Nations in any territories or waters to which they 
have legal right of access" (Article 32 of the Repertory of United 
Nations Practice 1955, 405). The Military Staff Committee was also 
unable to agree on the timeframe for the withdrawal of forces once 
their mission ended. The Soviets wanted a specific timeframe to be
established in order to guarantee that "forces would not be kept longer
than necessary" (Boulden 1990, 14). The rest of the members urged 
that a more flexible system of withdrawal be implemented, rather than 
one which made use of a specific timeframe. A U.S. Department of 
State position paper of the lime noted that one of the main reasons for 
Soviet dissent on this point was to prevent "forces furnished by nations 
other than the U.S.S.R. or its satellites" from entering Soviet controlled 
territory-they did not want a force acting under the auspices of the 
United Nations to gain control over their territories (Foreign Relations 
of the United States 1947. 637). However, a deeper investigation 
reveals that some leaders in the United States harbored the same fears. 
Several U.S. Senators wanted to be able to "exclude non-American 
forces from the Western Hemisphere in order to show that the Monroe 
Doctrine is unaffected"; this opinion, however, never became part of the 
official U.S. position (Notes of a conference between State Department 
officials and certain Senators in Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1946. 771). Again, self-interest on the part of the members and 
the political climate of the day accounted for the disagreement that 
ultimately ensued on the issue of force location.
Assistance and Facilities
While there was at least some items that were agreed to by the 
Military Staff Committee in the other areas, there was absolutely no 
agreement on any of the articles dealing with the use of facilities and 
the provision of assistance. The Soviets argued that the agreements on
the general principles of Article 43 did not pr - de for bases to be used
by other member nations. The use of facilities, according to the Soviets, 
would have to be determined by the special agreements. The issue of 
national sovereignty and their fear of a United Nations force 
dominating their territories were the reasons for their dissent on this 
question. The United States, conversely, advocated a more flexible
system in which there would be "a general guarantee of rights of 
passage and use of such of the Member Nation's available bases as arc 
required by armed forces operating under the Security Council" (Article 
25 of the Repertory of United Nations Practice 1955, 403). The driving 
force behind the United States' position was not so much a fear of 
having foreign forces on U.S. soil, but rather a fear of having an 
ineffective, inflexible system that too closely resembled the League of 
Nations. This fear, however, soon became reality--the Military Staff 
Committee deadlocked and the hope of having a collective security 
system with the necessary means of enforcement virtua
disappeared...
Reasons for Failure
The immediate question that has to be asked in light of the 
Military Staff Committee's apparent inability to reach an accord on 
Article 43 is "Why did such a noble idea fail to gain international 
support?" To find much of the answer, one must examine the 
1946-1947 discussions in the context of history. The inception of the 
Cold War clearly had an effect on the proceedings of the Military Staff 
Committee. A close analysis of the points of disagreement reveals that
many arose because of differences in ideology, noi for reasons of 
practicality or workability. If the Military Staff Committee report did 
nothing else, it did "unveil to the public vast areas of mistrust and
disagreement among the five permanent members" (Fabian 1972, 58). 
The Americans believed that the Soviet principle of equality was
designed to limit the size of U.S. forces while simultaneously increasing 
the size of Soviet military forces (Bouldcn 1990, 19). Likewise, the 
Soviets interpreted the American position on forward deployment as 
an indirect means of encircling their country. The rhetoric of the day. 
clearly, indicated the overt political nature and level of mistrust that
shrouded the deliberations of the Military Staff Committee. In a letter 
written at the time by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, this
reactionary attitude is made abundantly clear as he viewed the entire 
deadlock of the Military Staff Committee as "but a single example of 
Soviet tactics in the broad overall strategy of the Politburo to dominate 
the world" (Foreign Relations of the United States 1947. 657). With ) 
attitudes such as this prevailing in both camps, it is easy to see how the 
work on Article 43 eventually stalled.
To be sure, the disagreements between the superpowers were 
rarely over substantive issues. In fact, both nations agreed to the 
general principles of Article 43, they could just never agree on the 
finer points of implementation. Examining the major areas of 
contention--force size and contributions; force location; and assistance 
and facilities-one finds that the core motive of the disagreement was 
political mistrust of the other side (Bowett 1964, 18). Although some
of the blame for failure can be placed on the occasionally unrealistic 
and impractical interdependence of Article 43 and the rest of the 
Charter, the overriding factor for the 'lame and impotent conclusion' of 
the Military Staff Committee was the deterioration of East/West 
relations. Progress on the Article 43 system ceased after the MSC 
submitted their report to the Security Council, and any interest in 
reviving the system was put on hold for the duration of the Cold War. 
Recently, however, there have been some overtures by the Soviets as 
well as others calling for a reexamination of the Article 43 system. 
Certainly, any efforts in support of this should be regarded as hopeful 
and positive. Maybe this time, with fears and political mistrusts set 
aside, agreements can be reached and the collective security system 
long hoped for can finally become reality.
V. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE-THOUGHTS and CONCLUSIONS
After the failure of the Military Staff Committee to come to an 
agreement on Article 43, many ideas were presented as alternatives 
and stop-gap measures. These ideas were designed to take up the 
slack caused by the non-implementation of Article 43. Among the 
suggestions were the following: the creation of United Nations Guard 
Force, whose main purpose would be io protect United Nations missions 
in the field; "the Uniting for Peace resolution, (1950) which called for 
earmarking troops for U.N. service in the national armed forces of 
member states; and the use of ad hoc peacekeeping forces (Collective
lillilfc IpIlljipS
Security Possibilities... 1991. 3). Though the use of peacekeeping forces 
has been the de facto method for enforcing decisions of the United 
Nations, it is no substitute for an Article 43 force, as it lacks any 
deterrent value. Similarly, the other ideas were regarded as either too 
weak or too impractical for the mission of enforcement and maintaining 
international peace and security.
In addition to these alternatives, the experiences in Korea gave the 
United Nations a way to deal with acts of aggression in the absence of 
special agreements--General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions. By passing specific resolutions, the United Nations was 
able to circumvent Article 43, but still take military action as directed 
under Article 42. General Assembly resolution 377, adopted during the 
Korean War, stated that "each Member maintain within its national 
forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could 
promptly be made available in accordance with its constitutional 
processes for services as a U.N. unit or units upon recommendations by 
the Security Council or the General Assembly" (Schachter cited in 
Damrosch and Scheffer 1991, 69). Under this resolution, the United 
Nations was able to take action in Korea in support of its general 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security. However, this 
system was not perfect because the United Nations did not possess the 
power to force countries to contribute military units without special 
agreements in place.
During the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, the United Nations 
also made use of resolutions in order to take action authorized by
isililfii
Chapter VII. instead of making use of General Assembly resolutions, 
the actions that were taken were done via Security Council resolutions. 
The Security Council implemented Resolution 678 on November 29, 
1990, thereby allowing "all necessary means" (including the use of 
force) to be used in order to force Iraqi compliance with other U.N. 
resolutions (Scheffer in Damrosch and Scheffer 1991, 102). Although 
the allied coalition was successful in enforcing the decisions of the 
Security Council, this means of enforcement certainly should not serve 
as the model for handling future crises, because this process may not 
be able to be repeated in the future with the same level of 
effectiveness. In addition, a reliance on Article 51, which makes 
provision for forces to be used in self-defense, also suffers from the 
same drawback; the right of self defense does not guarantee that there 
will be enforcement action taken on the part of the United Nations. 
What is needed, therefore, is a system that will allow for special 
agreements to be concluded, thus giving the United Nations the force 
that it needs. And the opportunity to do this is now.
Some Proposals and Recommendations
The favorable international perception of the United Nations that 
currently exists (due in large part to the success that it had in handling 
the Gulf War) should be used as a springboard for implementing the 
Article 43 system. Dr. Vladimir Avakov of the former Soviet Union, 
noted in a paper presented at the Bilateral Meeting of the U.S.-Soviet 
Working Group on the Future of the U.N. held last summer in Moscow,
that "the success of the anti-Iraqi coalition has seriously shaken such 
(skeptical) sentiments. It is important not to lose this chance." (Avakov 
1991, 8). Considering this opportunity as well as President Bush's 
initiative for a new world order, the prospect for a successful
conclusion of special agreements is possible. Recognizing that the 
chance for reviving Article 43 is now, several proposals and 
recommendations have been voiced over the past year as to what
needs to be done.
Several experts in the area of international law and the United 
Nations assembled this past summer for the purpose of formulating 
some ideas and recommendations for the United Nations and Article 43. 
The meeting of the United Nations Association in Moscow this past 
summer produced a number of recommendations that, if carried out, 
could have a positive impact on the future of collective security as
envisaged by the United Nations. Recommendations for improving the 
provisions of Chapter VII included the following points;
1. The two UNA's and other nongovernmental groups should
convene an expert's meeting to hammer out model Special 
Agreements under Article 43 and present these to the Perm 
(sic) Five for comments. Later, the Permanent five and other 
member states could call a conference of U.N. members to
consider various model agreements.
2. The reluctance of countries to sign Article 43 might be 
overcome by giving states which have signed such agreements 
the right to say yes or no to the commitment of their troops in
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particular conflicts.
3. The Military Staff Committee should provide support, not 
operational, functions to both the Secretary General and the 
Security Council. Other nations might be included in these 
discussions in order to make the Military Staff Committee's role 
more acceptable to the broader U.N. membership (Conclusions 
and Policy Recommendations from the Joint Meeting between 
UNA-USA and the Soviet U.N. Association 1991. 4-5).
These proposals, if adopted, could greatly further the goal of 
achieving a working collective security system. As a first step, *hey 
con'd seek to overcome the issue of sovereignty infringement, as well 
as giving smaller stales some mote say over the use of their forces and 
the criteria for establishing special agreements. It is necessary to 
involve all members in the Article 43 process or else the system risks 
being less effective and more easily circumvented; these proposals 
would help to realize this requirement for collective security. The 
negotiators at the meeting also suggested that concluding special 
agreements would make nations less vulnerable to internal political 
factors when it comes time to call on forces. One cun point to the 
example of the Soviet Union in which a special agreement might have 
made Soviet foreign policy less susceptible to internal pressures and 
"less suspected of inconsistency on the part of international partners" 
(Avakov 1991, 6). While these proposals are not sufficient to 
guarantee the revitalization of the Article 43 system, they are 
necessary steps that must be taken by the United Nations in order to
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meet the goal of maintaining international peace and security.
Though the formal recommendations made by the United Nations 
Association are valuable, they do not fully address the issue of how the 
forces should be comprised. Questions still remain as to what type of 
force is the 'best' and how that force should be arrayed. Should the 
force consist of ad hoc forces (as in Korea and the Gulf)? Would a 
permanent, standing United Nations force be best? Should the United 
Nations form a rapid deployment force? All of these questions call 
forth important issues that will have to be answered. The idea of 
creating a U.N. rapid deployment force, addressed at the 1991 U.N.A. 
conference, holds considei.ble interest. Richard Gardner, chairman of 
the meeting, proposed that a rapid deployment force based on NATO's 
ACE Mobile Force (elements of which were deployed to Turke' during 
the Gulf War) could seive as the model for the United Nations. 
Specifically, he called for a force of between 10,000 and 50,000 that 
would be drawn mainly from middle or small powers, with twenty to 
thirty members each contributing a brigade-sized force. The supply of 
air and naval assets would be the responsibility of the permanent 
members. In addition, the forces would engage in joint training 
exercises so that the force would be able to conduct effective 
operations (personal notes of David Scheffer on the U.N.A. meeting 
1991). A force comprised such as this holds many advantages. The 
force would be able to more closely achieve the collective security 
criterion of diffusing power because of the diversity of the contributing 
forces. Secondly, as a virtue of its design, the force would be highly
mobile, and this rapid deployment capability would allow for quick and 
decisive action. Finally, the force could offer a great deterrent value 
because of its "moral weight" and ability to get involved swiftly in 
crises. With the end of bipolarity and the reduced likelihood of a large 
scale war, this type of force may well be an answer to the question of 
how the Article 43 force should be comprised.
UNSeaForce
While the Gardner proposal for a rapid deployment force tends to 
emphasize the use of land forces, this may not represent the most 
efficacious or most implcmentable plan. I would suggest an alternative 
proposal that would emphasize naval fori -s over land forces. 
Essentially, this plan, which 1 will call UNSeaForce, would be based 
around the use of naval and amphibious forces, rather than land forces, 
which are inherently less mobile and geographically limited in their 
use. The force would consist of five to eight carrier battle groups and 
the associated support ships. In addition, two to four brigades of 
Marines would be stationed on amphibious assault ships sailing with 
the carrier battle groups. Once formed, the naval forces would be 
deployed on the call of the Security Council or Military Staff Committee 
to those areas that are deemed to be threats to international security. 
The United States because of its large numbers of carriers would be 
expected to supply the majority of the carriers; the other four countries 
that currently operate carriers would also contribute. However, in 
order to assure that the force is truly international, support ships,
frigates, destroyers, marine units, aircraft (including carrier-based 
aircraft), sailors, facilities, and operating expenses could all be 
furnished by other member nations.
The comparative advantages offered by this UNSeaForce over a 
land-based force would be enormous. First and foremost, the force 
would be able to be on-the-scene of almost any international crisis in a 
relatively short amount of time. A land force might take months to 
deploy-a sea force could deploy within days or even hours. The naval 
force would also have the advantage of being able to project power 
without getting directly engaged in combat. In times of peace. United 
Nations naval units could be deployed off the coast of a country 
without violating the country's territorial sovereignty. These forces 
could then conduct humanitarian and show-of-force missions. The 
presence of a carrier battle group would also be able to offer a high 
degree of deterrence because of its capacity for power projection. If 
the force was unable to prevent acts of international aggression, its air 
and amphibious assets could be used to enforce U.N. decisions and 
engage the aggressor forces. Additionally, the sea force would give the 
United Nations the power to deal with drug trafficking, international 
terrorism and threats to the sea lines of communication. Finally, in 
terms of implementation, the UNSeaForce would not carry with it the 
same level of sovereignty infringement as would a land-based force 
because it would be primarily deployed at sea. Thus, this alternative 
plan might stand a better chance of actually being put into effecl-but 
any U.N. force created under Article 43 would be better than none at
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Since its inception in 1945, the United Nations has been a 
harbinger of peace and security to the nations of the world. It has 
provided the hungry with food. It has offered havens for refugees. 
But, never has it been able to employ its own military force in support 
of its resolutions and policies. The article that would have allowed it 
this necessary means of enforcement remains but an empty hope. 
Though the purpose of the U.N. force is noble—"to maintain 
international peace and security”-the members have never been able 
to agree on to how to proceed beyond the idea. Torn by differing 
ideologies and the Cold War, Article 43 has stood idly by, unused and 
unfulfilled. The transcripts from the debates of the Military Staff 
Committee stand as the last official testament on an idea that was 
forged out of two worlo wars and countless other acts of international 
aggression. For almt t fifty years, there has been no official work at 
trying to implement a system that could have prevented violence and 
bloodshed and millions of deaths. But today, the bipolar system that 
dominated those 'ast fifty years is gone, and with it many of the 
barriers that had prevented any positive movement on Article 43. 
Hope has replaced gloom. The new world order. Glasnost. The tearing 
down of the Berlin Wall. The success of the allied coalition forces. The 
world has changed and continues to change. The chance to finally 
realize the vision that Woodrow Wilson spoke of and the idea that was 
framed at Dumbarton Oaks has come. The conditions are right. The 
advantages are clear. Alea iacta est...
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